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Being able to envision emotional events that might happen in the future has a clear adaptive 
value. This study addressed the functional neuroanatomy of this process and investigated 
whether it is modulated by temporal distance. Participants imagined positive and negative 
events pertaining to the near future or far future while their brain activity was measured with 
fMRI. The results demonstrate that the anterior part of the ventromedial prefrontal cortex 
(vmPFC) was more active in envisioning emotional events in the far future than in the near 
future, whereas the caudate nucleus was engaged in envisioning emotional (especially 
positive) situations in the near future. We argue that the anterior part of the vmPFC might 
assign emotional values to mental representations of future events that pertain to long-term 
goals. On the other hand, the caudate might support more concrete simulations of action plans 




A fundamental aspect of human consciousness relates to the ability to temporarily withdraw 
attention from the immediate environment to mentally simulate episodes that might happen in 
the future (Atance and O'Neill, 2001; Buckner and Carroll, 2007; Morin, 2006; Suddendorf 
and Corballis, 2007; Tulving, 2005). This underlies the human capacity to foresee, plan, and 
shape virtually any specific future event, which has a clear adaptive value, enabling one to act 
flexibly in the present to increase future chances of survival (Suddendorf and Corballis, 
2007). Affective states associated with the anticipation of future outcomes play a major role in 
this process, with neural systems carrying emotional signals providing valuable implicit or 
explicit knowledge for making decisions that are advantageous in the long-term (Bechara and 
Damasio, 2005). Converging evidence from cognitive psychology, developmental 
psychology, neuropsychology, and psychopathology indicates that mental simulations of 
future events rely on episodic memory (Addis et al., in press; Atance and Meltzoff, 2005; 
D'Argembeau et al., in press; D'Argembeau and Van der Linden, 2004, 2006; Hassabis et al., 
2007; Klein et al., 2002; Spreng and Levine, 2006; Suddendorf and Busby, 2005; Szpunar and 
McDermott, in press; Tulving, 2005; Williams et al., 1996) and recruit multiple cognitive 
processes, such as scene construction (i.e., the retrieval and integration of elements of 
previous experiences into a coherent event) (Hassabis and Maguire, 2007; Schacter and 
Addis, 2007), a subjective sense of time and a reference to the self (Buckner and Carroll, 
2007; Tulving, 2005). Consistent with this view, recent functional neuroimaging studies have 
highlighted the engagement of a common neural network consisting of the ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex (vmPFC; Brodmann’s area (BA) 10, 11), medial temporal lobe 
(hippocampus and parahippocampal gyrus), and medial posterior regions (posterior cingulate 
and retrosplenial cortex) when participants are engaged in imagining future events and 
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remembering past events (Addis et al., 2007; Botzung et al., in press; Hassabis and Maguire, 
2007; Okuda et al., 2003; Szpunar et al., 2007). 
Despite their important role in future decision, few studies have directly investigated 
the neural substrates of emotion signals when people are consciously envisioning future 
emotional scenarios. Current evidence from lesion studies points to the vmPFC as a critical 
neural structure for triggering the affective/emotional signals associated with the imagination 
of future outcomes. In particular, studies that have used the Iowa Gambling Task indicate that 
patients with damage to the vmPFC fail to generate emotional signals in anticipation of future 
events, which led them to make decisions that are disadvantageous in the long-term (Bechara 
et al., 1997; Bechara et al., 2000). A recent fMRI study suggests that the vmPFC also 
participates in the conscious mental simulation of future emotional events (Sharot et al., in 
press). Participants were asked to generate future events in response to a series of cues 
describing positive and negative life episodes (e.g., ‘winning an award’ or ‘the end of a 
romantic relationship’). Thinking of these positive and negative future events led to increased 
activity in the vmPFC, posterior cingulate cortex, and amygdala, compared to fixation. 
Furthermore, the vmPFC was more engaged when envisioning positive future events relative 
to negative future events, a difference which correlated with participants’ trait optimism. 
Sharot et al. suggest that the vmPFC plays a role in tracking the emotional salience of future 
events and biases attention towards positive rather than negative future events, thereby 
fostering optimism. 
What is less understood is how the neural substrates of mental simulations of future 
emotional events are modulated by the perceived temporal distance of the future episodes. 
Throughout evolution, humans have developed greater capacity to envision events that are far 
more distant in the future (Leary, 2004; Suddendorf and Corballis, 2007) and it has been 
argued that the representation of emotional outcomes might be supported by distinct neural 
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systems for the near and far future (Bechara, 2005; Bechara and Damasio, 2005). According 
to this hypothesis, the anterior part of the vmPFC (BA 10, 11) is a critical neural structure for 
triggering the affective/emotional signals associated with long-term outcomes, whereas a 
more posterior neural system (including the posterior part of vmPFC (e.g., BA 25), the 
amygdala, and the striatum) is involved in triggering the affective/emotional signals of 
immediate outcomes. Three lines of research are in keeping with such a distinction. First, it 
has been found that thinking of the far future (the next several years) compared to thinking of 
the near future (the next few days) engages the anterior vmPFC (BA 10, 11) (Okuda et al., 
2003), and patients with damage to this region demonstrate a severe shortening in their 
personal future time perspective (Fellows and Farah, 2005). Second, research in animals and 
humans indicates that the anticipation of immediate emotional outcomes (especially rewards) 
engages the striatum, the amygdala, and the orbitofrontal cortex (for reviews, see Knutson and 
Cooper, 2005; O'Doherty, 2004; Schultz, 2000). Third, functional neuroimaging studies of 
time discounting for rewards show that activation of the striatum and posterior vmPFC is 
greater for choices between an immediate reward and a delayed reward than for choices 
between two delayed rewards (McClure et al., 2004; McClure et al., 2007). However, to our 
knowledge, no study has examined whether the anterior-posterior distinction also exists when 
comparing consciously simulated emotional events in the near and in the far future. 
The primary goal of this study was to further explore the neural substrates of 
conscious mental simulations of future emotional events and, more specifically, to investigate 
whether distinct brain regions are engaged depending on the perceived temporal distance of 
the future episodes. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), we directly 
compared the brain regions recruited for imagining far and near future emotional events. In a 
pre-scan interview session, participants were asked to generate a list of positive and negative 
events that might happen to them in the near future (i.e., in the next few days or weeks) or in 
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the far future (i.e., in at least one year). They were also asked to think of some routine 
activities (e.g., showering), which were used to control for the process of scene construction 
(i.e., the retrieval and integration of elements of previous experiences into a coherent scene) 
(Hassabis and Maguire, 2007). For each future event and routine activity, participants were 
asked to write a short cue that summarizes the essence of the event and to rate each event for 
vividness/amount of details, temporal distance, and emotional valence on a 7-point rating 
scale. The next day, participants were presented with the cues and were asked to mentally 
simulate the corresponding future events and routine activities while their brain activity was 
measured with fMRI. Participants were required to imagine each event for 15 seconds, and 
they were asked to rate their feeling of mentally experiencing the event by means of a 4-point 
rating scale after the 15 second period. In line with previous studies (Addis et al., 2007; 
Botzung et al., in press; Hassabis and Maguire, 2007; Okuda et al., 2003; Sharot et al., in 
press; Szpunar et al., 2007), we expected to observe activations in the vmPFC and medial 
posterior regions (posterior cingulate/retrosplenial cortex) when participants were envisioning 
near and far future events as compared to routine activities. We further hypothesized that the 
neural substrates of envisioning future emotional events would be modulated by temporal 
distance, that is, mentally simulating emotional events that are far in the future would engage 
the anterior vmPFC to a greater extent, whereas simulating emotional events in the near future 
would engage more posterior regions, such as the posterior vmPFC and/or the striatum. 
 
Materials and methods 
Participants 
Twelve healthy right-handed young adults (7 women, 5 men; mean age: 25 years, range: 22-
28 years) were recruited from the University of Southern California (USC) campus. They all 
 7
gave written informed consent and were paid for their participation. All experimental 
procedures had prior approval by the Institutional Review Board at USC. 
 
Tasks description and procedure 
One day before the fMRI session, subjects participated in a pre-scan interview in a quiet room 
of our laboratory. They were asked to imagine four types of future events: positive events that 
might happen to them in the near future (NearPos), negative events that might happen to them 
in the near future (NearNeg), positive events that might happen to them in the far future 
(FarPos), and negative events that might happen to them in the far future (FarNeg). The near 
future was defined as the next few days or weeks (with a maximum of a month), whereas the 
far future corresponded to events occurring in at least one year from now. A positive event 
was defined as something participants are looking forward to, whereas a negative event was 
defined as an experience they would prefer to avoid. Participants had to imagine five events 
of each type and for each type of event, they had to envision episodes related to some broad 
categories: 2 events related to work or school, 2 events related to family or friends, and 1 
event related to a romantic relationship; these categories were used because they are the most 
frequently reported when people were asked to envision positive and negative future events 
(D'Argembeau and Van der Linden, 2004). Within these broad categories, participants were 
free to imagine any event they wanted, provided that it consisted of a specific episode (i.e., an 
event happening at a particular place and time and lasting no longer than a day) that might 
plausibly happen to them in the specified time period. For each future event, participants were 
asked to generate a short sentence summarizing the content of the event, which was used as a 
cue for the fMRI session. They were also asked to take a few seconds to imagine the event in 
as much detail as possible and to consider, in particular, when and where the event would 
occur, the persons and objects that would be present, the actions, and their feelings. Then, 
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they rated their imaginations on a 7-point rating scale that assessed vividness/amount of 
details (1 = vague with no details, 7 = vivid and highly detailed), subjective feeling of 
temporal distance (1 = the event feels very close in time, 7 = the event feels very far away), 
and emotional valence (-3 = very negative, 0 = neutral, +3 = very positive).  
During the pre-scan interview, participants were also asked to select five routine 
activities, which were used as control tasks in the fMRI session. These routine activities were 
defined as repetitive tasks that participants perform everyday (or at least several times a week) 
and that are emotionally neutral (e.g., taking a shower, washing the dishes). They were asked 
to imagine each routine activity in as much detail as possible (i.e., to think of where the 
activity takes place, the persons and objects that are present, and the actions) and it was 
further specified that they should consider these activities in a general way (i.e., considering 
how the activity typically unfolds instead of considering a particular occasion when they did 
this activity). This control task was selected because it involved processes of scene 
construction (i.e., the retrieval and integration of elements of previous experiences into a 
coherent scene; Hassabis & Maguire, 2007) that are similar to the imagination of future 
events, but had no temporal or emotional components. For each routine activity, participants 
also rated their representation for vividness/amount of details (1 = vague with no details, 7 = 
vivid and highly detailed) and emotional valence (-3 = very negative, 0 = neutral, +3 = very 
positive).  
During the fMRI session, participants had to think about the future events and daily 
routines they imagined the day before. Each event was cued by a slide that contained a written 
description of the event (i.e., near future, far future, or daily routine) and the cue created by 
the participants (e.g., “Near future: Concert with Jen on Saturday,” “Far future: Dad has a 
stroke in my presence,” “Daily routine: Getting dressed”). For future events, participants were 
instructed to project themselves in each specific event, to imagine it in as much detail as 
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possible, and to consider, in particular, the time period when the event would happen, the 
location where it would occur, the persons and/or objects that would be present, the actions, 
and their feelings. For the routine activities, they were told to imagine themselves doing each 
activity in as much detail as possible and to consider where the activity occurs, the persons 
and/or objects that are present, and the actions. It was further specified that they should 
consider each activity as it typically unfolds (instead of remembering a particular occasion 
when they did this activity).  
Each trial consisted of the following sequence of events: (1) cue presentation: visual 
presentation of the cue slide; participants were asked to read the cue in order to identify the 
event and then to close their eyes and to press a button to indicate that they began to imagine 
the event (a beep was presented to confirm button press). This stage was self-paced and could 
take up to 5 seconds. (2) imagination phase: this stage started right after the button press; 
participants imagined the event with eyes closed for 15 s. (3) rating: after 15 s, participants 
heard a beep indicating that they need to open their eyes and to rate the extent to which they 
had the feeling of mentally experiencing the event; a 4-point rating scale was displayed for 5 s 
on the screen, during which participants had to make their judgment (1 = not at all, 4 = 
completely). Trials were separated by a rest period which was jittered between 2 to 10s 
(exponential distribution with a mean of 5 s), during which a fixation cross was presented. To 
reduce the interference effect of scanner noise on participants’ imagination in the beginning of 
the scan, participants completed one practice run while structural images were acquired. After 
that, three functional runs were acquired for each participant. Each run consisted of the same 
25 cues (5 per event category), with the order randomized from run to run. In total, each event 
was thus imagined four times. fMRI data were collected for each event three times. It was 
specified that participants were not required to imagine exactly the same things each time they 
were presented with a particular cue (e.g., they might think of additional details concerning 
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the event the second time they imagine it), the important point being that, on each trial, they 
were required to try to project themselves into the event in as much detail as possible in order 
to mentally experience the situation. Each run lasted between 10.8 and 12.5 min, depending 
on the time taken by participants to identify each event and to press the button to indicate they 
begin envisioning it. Interviews conducted immediately after the fMRI session indicated that 
participants were able to project themselves into the future events each time the relevant cue 
was presented (i.e., they did not simply remember the simulations they had previously made 
during the pre-scan interview or during the previous run). The post-scan interviews also 
confirmed that participants were able to think of routine activities in a temporally 




MRI recording was performed using a standard birdcage head-coil on a Siemens 3T 
MAGNETON Trio MRI system with TIM housed in the Dana and David Dornsife Cognitive 
Neuroscience Imaging Center at USC. Participants lay supine on a scanner bed, and viewed 
visual stimuli back-projected onto a screen through a mirror attached onto the head coil. Foam 
pads were used to minimize head motion. 
Blood-oxygenation-level-dependent (BOLD) signal were measured with a T2*-
weighted echo-planar imaging (EPI) sequence (TR=2000 ms, TE=25 ms, flip angle=90°, 
FOV=192×192 mm, in-plane resolution=64×64 pixels or 3×3 mm). Thirty-one interlaced 
axial slices, with thickness of 3.5 mm (no gap), were acquired to cover the whole brain. For 
each participant, three functional runs were collected, each of which lasted between 10.8 and 
12.5 min (between 324 and 375 volumes). For each participant, high resolution (1 x 1 x1 
 11
mm3) anatomical images were obtained with a T1-weighted 3D MPRAGE sequence (TI=900 
ms, TR=2070 ms, TE=4.13 ms, flip angle = 7°). The whole session lasted about 1 hour. 
 
fMRI analyses 
Imaging data were pre-processed and analyzed using SPM5 (Wellcome Department of 
Imaging Neuroscience; www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). Functional images were realigned and 
unwarped, normalized directly to the MNI EPI template (voxel size = 3 × 3 × 3 mm), and 
spatially smoothed with a Gaussian kernel with full-width at half maximum (FWHM) of 
8 mm. 
For each participant, BOLD responses were estimated using a general linear model. 
For each trial, the cue presentation, imagination phase, and rating were modelled separately. 
All of the five conditions were included in the model. The canonical SPM HRF was used, 
with time derivatives. A high pass filter was implemented using a cut-off period of 128 s in 
order to remove the low-frequency drifts from the time series. Serial autocorrelations were 
accounted for using an autoregressive AR(1) model. For each individual participant, we first 
contrasted the imagination phase of near future events with the imagination phase of routine 
activities [(NearPos + NearNeg) – Control] and the imagination phase of far future events 
with the imagination phase of routine activities (FarPos + FarNeg) – Control]. Then, for 
future events, we examined the main effect of temporal distance [(FarPos + FarNeg) – 
(NearPos + NearNeg)], the main effect of valence [(NearPos + FarPos) – (NearNeg + 
FarNeg)], and their interaction [(NearPos – NearNeg) – (FarPos – FarNeg)] by defining the 
proper contrasts for each participant. The resulting contrasts were entered into second-level 
random-effects analyses (one-sample t-tests) in order to compute group effects. For each a 
priori region of interest (ROI), statistical inferences were performed at the voxel level at p < 
.05 corrected for multiple comparisons over entire search volume of the ROI using random 
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field theory. Volumes of interest corresponding to the vmPFC (defined as z coordinate ≤ 0 
mm) and striatal regions (caudate nucleus, putamen, and nucleus accumbens) were 
anatomically defined using the automated anatomical labelling map (AAL) (Tzourio-Mazoyer 
et al., 2002) and were used for small volume corrections. For other brain regions, we report 
clusters with more than 10 voxels (3 X 3 X 3 mm) activated above a threshold of p < .001 
(uncorrected). Finally, ROI analyses were also conducted to quantify the activations within 
each region. Functional ROIs were defined as 6 mm sphere around the local maxima based on 
the group averaged results. We calculated for each participant and each ROI the mean effect 
size for each future task relative to the control task. These values were then submitted to 2 





The mean ratings for vividness, feelings of temporal distance, and valence obtained 
during the pre-scan interview are shown in Table 1. One-way ANOVA showed that vividness 
ratings differed as a function of event type (F(4, 44) = 12.70, p < .001), and follow-up 
comparisons indicated that representations of routine activities were rated as being more vivid 
than representations of each type of future events (all ps < .001). There was also an effect of 
event type for valence (F(4, 44) = 629.17, p < .001); follow-up comparisons showed that 
compared to the routine activities, the ratings of valence of the imagined positive future 
events were indeed more positive (both ps < .001), and the negative future events were indeed 
more negative (both ps < .001).  
Focusing on the future events, temporal distance (far vs. near) by valence (positive vs. 
negative) ANOVA was conducted for each type of ratings. For vividness, the effect of 
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temporal distance and valence were not significant, nor was the interaction between the two 
factors (all ps > .21). For feelings of temporal distance, the ANOVA yielded an effect of 
temporal distance (F(1, 11) = 275.77, p < .0001), confirming that far future events felt more 
distant in time than near future events; there was no effect of valence, nor interaction (all ps > 
.10). For ratings of valence, there was a main effect of valence (F(1, 11) = 1409.63, p < .0001) 
and an interaction between valence and temporal distance (F(1, 11) = 13.28, p = .003), 
indicating that positive and negative events received higher valence ratings for the far future 
than for the near future.  
 
fMRI session 
Initial analyses did not reveal any effect of repetition of imaginations across runs or 
any interaction involving this factor, so data from the three functional runs are combined in 
the reported analyses. The feeling of experiencing the events during the fMRI session differed 
as a function of the type of events (F(4, 44) = 9.18, p < .001; see Table 1 for means and SD), 
and follow-up comparisons showed that routine activities received higher ratings compared to 
each type of future events (all ps < .05), except near positive events (p = .44). For future 
events, a 2 (temporal distance) X 2 (valence) ANOVA yielded a main effect of temporal 
distance (F(1, 11) = 23.63, p < .001) and a main effect of valence (F(1, 11) = 10.03, p < .01), 
showing that ratings were higher for the near future than for the far future, and higher for 
positive events than for negative events; the interaction was not significant (F(1, 11) = 0.39, p = 
.54).  
The time taken to identify each event (as assessed by the button press) differed as a 
function of the type of events (F(4, 44) = 6.05, p < .001); follow-up comparisons showed that 
routine activities were identified more quickly than each type of future events (all ps < .05; 
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see Table 1 for means and SD). For future events, a 2 (temporal distance) X 2 (valence) 
ANOVA did not reveal any significant main effect or interaction (all F(1, 11) < 2.21, ps > .16). 
 
fMRI data 
Near and far future events versus routine activities 
Imagining emotional events in the near and far future was associated with similar 
activation patterns in medial prefrontal and medial posterior regions, relative to imagining 
routine activities (Figure 1 and Table 2). More specifically, for both the near and the far 
future, increased activations were detected in the vmPFC (encompassing BA 10 and 11), the 
dorsomedial PFC (BA 9/10) and the posterior cingulate/retrosplenial cortex. Increases in 
activation associated with imagining near and far future events were also detected in the 
inferior temporal gyrus and the temporoparietal junction (see Table 2 for MNI coordinates 
and Z values). A conjunction analysis (i.e., [Near future > control AND Far future > control]) 
confirmed that these regions were commonly engaged by near and far future events (see 
Figure 1 and Table 2). 
 
Effects of temporal distance and valence 
When directly comparing the brain regions recruited for imagining emotional events in 
the near and far future, we found that the ventral part of the anterior vmPFC (BA 11) was 
more active when envisioning the far future (Figure 2 and Table 3). Imagining the far versus 
near future also led to increased activations in the left middle temporal gyrus, the left and 
right inferior temporal gyrus, and the left inferior frontal gyrus (see Table 3 for MNI 
coordinates and Z values). By contrast, the left caudate nucleus was more active when 
imagining emotional events in the near future than in the far future (Figure 2 and Table 3). 
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We also explored the effect of valence by comparing the brain regions recruited for 
imagining positive and negative future events. Imagining positive versus negative events was 
associated with activation in the vmPFC (BA 10), in a region more dorsal than the region 
detected for the effect of temporal distance (Figure 3 and Table 4). Envisioning positive 
events also led to increased activations in the left caudate nucleus, the left middle/superior 
frontal gyrus, the posterior cingulate/retrosplenial cortex, the lateral temporal cortex (in the 
left middle temporal gyrus and the left and right inferior temporal gyrus), the left and right 
temporoparietal junction, the left hippocampus, the right parahippocampal gyrus, the anterior 
cingulate, and the lingual gyrus (see Table 4 for MNI coordinates and Z values). Imagining 
negative events relative to positive events did not lead to significant activation. The temporal 
distance X valence interaction did not reveal any significant activation either. 
 
ROI results 
For each region of interest (ROI), we conducted a 2 X 2 ANOVA on the mean effect 
size to further evaluate the main effects of temporal distance and valence, and their interaction 
(see Material and methods for details). For the ventral part of anterior vmPFC (BA 11; peak 
activation at x = -3, y = 51, z = -18), the ANOVA showed a main effect of temporal distance 
(F(1, 11) = 36.4, p < .001) and no effect of valence (F(1, 11) = 1.99, p = .19), nor interaction (F(1, 
11) = 0.03, p = .86). This result provides further evidence that the recruitment of this part of the 
vmPFC was specifically related to temporal distance (see Figure 2(a), right panel, for effect 
sizes). For the more dorsal part of anterior vmPFC (BA 10; peak activation at x = 0, y = 57, z 
= -3), the ANOVA showed a main effect of valence (F(1, 11) = 32.2, p < .001) and no effect of 
temporal distance (F(1, 11) = 0.37, p = .56), nor interaction (F(1, 11) = 0.06, p = .81), indicating 
that the recruitment of this part of the vmPFC was specifically related to valence (see Figure 
3, right panel, for effect sizes). Finally, the left caudate nucleus (peak activation at x = -12, y = 
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21, z = -3) is not only involved in imagining the near versus far future (F(1, 11) = 33.63, p < 
.001), but is also recruited to a greater extent when envisioning positive compared to negative 
future events (F(1, 11) = 10.30, p = .008); there is no interaction (F(1, 11) = 2.38, p = .15) (see 
Figure 2(b), right panel, for effect sizes).  
 
Discussion 
This study addressed the functional neuroanatomy of mental simulations of future emotional 
events and investigated whether it is modulated by temporal distance. We found that 
envisioning near and far future events recruited the vmPFC, the dorsomedial PFC, medial 
posterior regions (posterior cingulate/retrosplenial cortex), the lateral temporal cortex and the 
temporoparietal junction to a greater extent than imagining routine activities. More 
importantly, this study demonstrates that part of the neural circuit engaged when envisioning 
the future is modulated by the temporal distance of the events. That is, activation of the 
ventral part of anterior vmPFC (BA 11) was greater when envisioning emotional events in the 
far future, whereas the left caudate nucleus responded more to emotional events in the near 
future. Neural substrates of envisioning the future were also modulated by emotional valence, 
with the imagination of positive events (relative to negative events) leading to activations in 
the dorsal part of anterior vmPFC (BA 10), the left dorsolateral PFC, the left caudate nucleus, 
the posterior cingulate/retrosplenial cortex, the lateral temporal cortex, the temporoparietal 
junction, the left hippocampus, the right parahippocampal gyrus, the anterior cingulate, and 
the lingual gyrus. 
The engagement of the vmPFC and medial posterior regions when envisioning future 
events versus routine activities is in agreement with previous studies of episodic future 
thinking (Addis et al., 2007; Botzung et al., in press; Hassabis and Maguire, 2007; Okuda et 
al., 2003; Sharot et al., in press; Szpunar et al., 2007). The vmPFC (especially BA 10) has 
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been associated with self-referential processing, both in the context of personality trait 
judgments (D'Argembeau et al., 2005, 2007; Johnson et al., 2002; Kelley et al., 2002; 
Northoff et al., 2006) and autobiographical memory (Cabeza and St Jacques, 2007; Gilboa, 
2004; Svoboda et al., 2006). The posterior cingulate/retrosplenial cortex is thought to play a 
role in putting self-referential information in a temporal and spatial context (Northoff et al., 
2006) and might also mediate interactions between emotion and episodic memory (Maddock, 
1999). Activation of the vmPFC and posterior cingulate/retrosplenial cortex in this study 
might therefore reveal more self-reflection, a higher emotional involvement, and/or an 
increased subjective sense of time when envisioning future events compared to routine 
activities. Alternatively, some authors have argued that the primary role of medial prefrontal 
and posterior regions is related to the process of scene construction (i.e., the retrieval and 
integration of elements of previous experiences into a coherent scene) (Hassabis and Maguire, 
2007). In this study, both the future tasks and the control task involved scene construction and 
mental images of routine activities were actually rated as containing more details than images 
of future events. We are thus inclined to think that activation of the vmPFC and the posterior 
cingulate/retrosplenial cortex cannot be entirely explained by the process of scene 
construction. It remains possible, however, that scene construction was easier for routine 
activities than for future events. It should also be noted that, contrary to some previous studies 
(e.g., Addis et al., 2007; Okuda et al., 2003), we did not find activation of the medial temporal 
lobe when contrasting future events with routine activities. This discrepancy between studies 
is likely due to differences in the nature of comparison tasks. As already mentioned, the 
imagination of routine activities required the retrieval and integration of pieces of information 
to construct a coherent scene, which is thought to rely on the hippocampus (Hassabis & 
Maguire, 2007; Schacter & Addis, 2007). Thus, the future tasks and the comparison task used 
in the current study both involved a high degree of scene construction, which might have 
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subtracted out hippocampal activation. On the other hand, the control tasks used in previous 
studies (e.g., semantic retrieval) relied less on scene construction processes. 
A key finding of this study is that imagining emotional events in the far future led to 
increased activations in the ventral part of anterior vmPFC (BA 11), the lateral temporal 
cortex and the left inferior frontal gyrus, compared to imagining emotional events in the near 
future. Although representations of future events probably contain a mixture of episodic and 
semantic information both for the near and far future, the proportion of episodic and semantic 
components likely differs according to temporal distance. Indeed, there is evidence that 
people represent far future events more in terms of abstract goal-related knowledge (e.g., the 
“why” aspects of an action) and near future events more in terms of concrete details about the 
means for achieving their goals (e.g., the “how” details of the action) (Trope and Liberman, 
2003). The present result that the feeling of experiencing the events was higher for near than 
for far future events might reflect these differences in levels of concreteness (see also 
D’Argembeau and Van der Linden, 2004). Our fMRI data regarding the effect of temporal 
distance also fit well with these ideas. Activity in the lateral temporal cortex and left inferior 
frontal gyrus have been observed during semantic processing (Poldrack et al., 1999; 
Vandenberghe et al., 1996). In the context of autobiographical memory, it is thought to reflect 
the retrieval of general autobiographical knowledge (conceptual knowledge about life periods 
and goals) that contextualizes event-specific knowledge (Conway, 2005; Svoboda et al., 
2006). We speculate that when envisioning future events these regions support the activation 
of semantic information concerning anticipated future life periods and goals. We further 
suggest that the ventral part of anterior vmPFC (BA 11) might sustain the retrieval and 
monitoring of such goal-related knowledge and assign emotional value to mental 
representations of future events that pertain to these goals, thus helping make decisions that 
are advantageous in the long-term (Bechara and Damasio, 2005). Another (not necessarily 
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incompatible) possibility would be that activation of this region reflects the processing of 
more uncertain future events. Although there are some constraints in the process of imagining 
far future events (e.g., envisioning events that are plausible with regard to one’s goals and 
resources), the far future is much more open and uncertain than the near future, for which 
some events have been planned in details and are anticipated with high degrees of certainty. It 
has been suggested that the ventral part of anterior vmPFC participates in the processing of 
situations that are less predictable and that involve a degree of uncertainty with respect to 
outcomes (Bechara and Damasio, 2005; Elliott et al., 2000). Actually, future events’ 
dimensions such as temporal distance, abstractness, and predictability are intimately related, 
so it is difficult to determine which factor(s) was of primary importance in the present results. 
Future studies should thus be conducted to disentangle the specific influences of these 
dimensions.  
For the near versus far future, we found increased activations in the left caudate 
nucleus, especially for positive events. As already noted, the near future is typically 
represented more in terms of concrete details for achieving goals, such as the “how” details of 
an action (Trope and Liberman, 2003). In previous studies, the caudate has been associated 
with planning and the imagination of actions (Gerardin et al., 2000; Jeannerod, 2001). Its role 
in episodic future thinking might thus consist of supporting the mental simulation of actions 
one intends to execute in near future events. The caudate has also been associated with reward 
processing, and more specifically the integration of information about anticipated reward with 
processes that mediate the behavior leading to reward acquisition (Knutson and Cooper, 2005; 
Schultz, 2000). Our finding that activation of the caudate was especially related to the 
imagination of near positive events fit well with these ideas. Perhaps one key aspect of 
envisioning the near future is to mentally simulate a series of action plans to maximize the 
probability of attaining forthcoming rewarding situations.  
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It remains to be explained why only part of the posterior neural system expected to be 
associated with processing near future events was activated in this study, and in particular 
why we did not find activation of the posterior vmPFC. One possibility is that there is no 
strong dissociation between different parts of the vmPFC in relation to envisioning near and 
far future events, but that some areas are recruited to a greater extent when envisioning the far 
future. As can be seen from Figure 1, the vmPFC regions engaged for envisioning the near 
and far future are largely overlapping; yet direct comparison of far and near future 
demonstrates that the ventral part of anterior vmPFC is recruited to a greater extent for the far 
future (Figure 2(a)). The distinction between anterior and posterior parts of the vmPFC might 
thus be more a matter of degree (i.e., the further we go in the future, the more we engage the 
more anterior vmPFC) than a true dissociation.  
Finally, we found that some brain regions were more activated for positive than for 
negative future events. These results are consistent with a recent study which also showed 
increased activity in several brain regions (including the vmPFC) for the imagination of 
positive versus negative future events (Sharot et al., in press). It should be noted, however, 
that in this latter study positive future events were imagined to be closer in time than negative 
future events, so it is difficult to disentangle the effects of valence from the effects of 
temporal distance. In the current study, activation of the dorsal part of anterior vmPFC (BA 
10) was specifically associated with the valence of future events. As mentioned above, this 
part of the vmPFC has been related to self-referential processing (D'Argembeau et al., 2007; 
Johnson et al., 2002; Kelley et al., 2002; Northoff et al., 2006). There is abundant evidence 
that most people hold positive views of themselves and their future and are more willing to 
consider information that bolsters this conception than information that contradicts it (Leary, 
2007; Taylor and Brown, 1988). We speculate that activation of the dorsal part of anterior 
vmPFC (BA 10) might thus reveal a stronger personal involvement when envisioning positive 
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rather than negative future events. Another possibility would be that activity in this region 
reflects increased emotional processing (e.g., emotion appraisal, experience, and/or 
regulation; Phan et al., 2004) for positive events. The other brain regions that were more 
activated for positive than for negative events (i.e., left dorsolateral PFC, posterior 
cingulate/retrosplenial cortex, the lateral temporal cortex, left hippocampus, temporoparietal 
junction, anterior cingulate, and lingual gyrus) have been frequently observed in studies of 
autobiographical memory (Svoboda et al., 2006) and might reflect increased retrieval and 
integration of semantic and visuospatial details for positive events. Our finding that ratings for 
feeling of experiencing were higher for positive than for negative events is consistent with 
this interpretation (see also D'Argembeau and Van der Linden, 2004).  
In conclusion, the present study demonstrates that the neural substrates of mental 
simulations of future emotional events are modulated by the temporal distance of imagined 
episodes. Specifically, the ventral part of anterior vmPFC (BA 11) was more active for 
envisioning emotional situations in the far future, whereas more posterior regions, and more 
specifically the caudate nucleus was more engaged for envisioning emotional situations in the 
near future. We argued that the ventral part of anterior vmPFC might support the retrieval and 
monitoring of long-term goal-related knowledge and assign emotional value to mental images 
of events pertaining to these goals. On the other hand, striatal regions such as the caudate 
nucleus might support more concrete simulations of action plans to achieve rewarding 
situations in the near future.  
 
 
Acknowledgments: This research was supported by NSF Grant No IIS 04-42586, and by 
grants No DA11779, DA12487, and DA16708 from the National Institute on Drug Abuse 





Addis, D.R., Wong, A.T., Schacter, D.L., 2007. Remembering the past and imagining the 
future: Common and distinct neural substrates during event construction and 
elaboration. Neuropsychologia 45, 1363-1377. 
Addis, D.R., Wong, A.T., Schacter, D.L., in press. Age-related changes in the episodic 
simulation of future events. Psychological Science. 
Atance, C.M., Meltzoff, A.N., 2005. My future self: Young children's ability to anticipate and 
explain future states. Cognitive Development 20, 341-361. 
Atance, C.M., O'Neill, D.K., 2001. Episodic future thinking. Trends Cogn Sci. 5, 533-539. 
Bechara, A., 2005. Decision making, impulse control and loss of willpower to resist drugs: a 
neurocognitive perspective. Nat.Neurosci. 8, 1458-1463. 
Bechara, A., Damasio, A.R., 2005. The somatic marker hypothesis: A neural theory of 
economic decision. Games and Economic Behavior 52, 336-372. 
Bechara, A., Damasio, H., Damasio, A.R., 2000. Emotion, decision making and the 
orbitofrontal cortex. Cereb.Cortex 10, 295-307. 
Bechara, A., Damasio, H., Tranel, D., Damasio, A.R., 1997. Deciding advantageously before 
knowing the advantageous strategy. Science 275, 1293-1295. 
Botzung, A., Denkova, E., Manning, L., in press. Experiencing past and future personal 
events: Functional neuroimaging evidence on the neural bases of mental time travel. 
Brain and Cognition. 
Buckner, R.L., Carroll, D.C., 2007. Self-projection and the brain. Trends Cogn Sci. 11, 49-57. 
Cabeza, R., St Jacques, P., 2007. Functional neuroimaging of autobiographical memory. 
Trends Cogn Sci. 11, 219-227. 
Conway, M.A., 2005. Memory and the self. Journal of Memory and Language 53, 594-628. 
D’Argembeau, A., Collette, F., Van der Linden, M., Laureys, S., Del Fiore, G., Degueldre, C., 
Luxen, A., & Salmon, E. (2005). Self-referential reflective activity and its relationship 
with rest: A PET study. NeuroImage 25, 616-624. 
D'Argembeau, A., Raffard, S., Van der Linden, M., in press. Remembering the past and 
imagining the future in schizophrenia. J. Abnorm. Psychol. 
D'Argembeau, A., Ruby, P., Collette, F., Degueldre, C., Balteau, E., Luxen, A., Maquet, P., 
Salmon, E., 2007. Distinct regions of the medial prefrontal cortex are associated with 
self-referential processing and perspective taking. J.Cogn Neurosci. 19, 935-944. 
 23
D'Argembeau, A., Van der Linden, M., 2006. Individual differences in the phenomenology of 
mental time travel: The effect of vivid visual imagery and emotion regulation 
strategies. Conscious.Cogn 15, 342-350. 
D'Argembeau, A., Van der Linden, M., 2004. Phenomenal characteristics associated with 
projecting oneself back into the past and forward into the future: influence of valence 
and temporal distance. Conscious.Cogn 13, 844-858. 
Elliott, R., Dolan, R.J., Frith, C.D., 2000. Dissociable functions in the medial and lateral 
orbitofrontal cortex: evidence from human neuroimaging studies. Cereb.Cortex 10, 
308-317. 
Fellows, L.K., Farah, M.J., 2005. Dissociable elements of human foresight: a role for the 
ventromedial frontal lobes in framing the future, but not in discounting future rewards. 
Neuropsychologia 43, 1214-1221. 
Gerardin, E., Sirigu, A., Lehericy, S., Poline, J.B., Gaymard, B., Marsault, C., Agid, Y., Le, 
B.D., 2000. Partially overlapping neural networks for real and imagined hand 
movements. Cereb.Cortex 10, 1093-1104. 
Gilboa, A., 2004. Autobiographical and episodic memory--one and the same? Evidence from 
prefrontal activation in neuroimaging studies. Neuropsychologia 42, 1336-1349. 
Hassabis, D., Kumaran, D., Vann, S.D., Maguire, E.A., 2007. Patients with hippocampal 
amnesia cannot imagine new experiences. Proc.Natl.Acad.Sci.U.S.A 104, 1726-1731. 
Hassabis, D., Maguire, E.A., 2007. Deconstructing episodic memory with construction. 
Trends Cogn Sci. 11, 299-306. 
Jeannerod, M., 2001. Neural simulation of action: a unifying mechanism for motor cognition. 
Neuroimage. 14, S103-S109. 
Johnson, S.C., Baxter, L.C., Wilder, L.S., Pipe, J.G., Heiserman, J.E., Prigatano, G.P., 2002. 
Neural correlates of self-reflection. Brain 125, 1808-1814. 
Kelley, W.M., Macrae, C.N., Wyland, C.L., Caglar, S., Inati, S., Heatherton, T.F., 2002. 
Finding the self?: An event-related fMRI study. J.Cogn.Neurosci. 14, 785-794. 
Klein, S.B., Loftus, J., Kihlstrom, J.F., 2002. Memory and temporal experience: The effects of 
episodic memory loss on an amnesic patient's ability to remember the past and 
imagine the future. Social Cognition 20, 353-379. 
Knutson, B., Cooper, J.C., 2005. Functional magnetic resonance imaging of reward 
prediction. Curr.Opin.Neurol. 18, 411-417. 
Leary, M.R., 2004. The curse of the self: Self-awareness, egotism, and the quality of human 
life. Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Leary, M.R., 2007. Motivational and emotional aspects of the self. Annu.Rev.Psychol. 58, 
317-344. 
 24
Maddock, R.J., 1999. The retrosplenial cortex and emotion: new insights from functional 
neuroimaging of the human brain. Trends Neurosci. 22, 310-316. 
McClure, S.M., Ericson, K.M., Laibson, D.I., Loewenstein, G., Cohen, J.D., 2007. Time 
discounting for primary rewards. J.Neurosci. 27, 5796-5804. 
McClure, S.M., Laibson, D.I., Loewenstein, G., Cohen, J.D., 2004. Separate neural systems 
value immediate and delayed monetary rewards. Science 306, 503-507. 
Morin, A., 2006. Levels of consciousness and self-awareness: A comparison and integration 
of various neurocognitive views. Conscious.Cogn 15, 358-371. 
Northoff, G., Heinzel, A., de, G.M., Bermpohl, F., Dobrowolny, H., Panksepp, J., 2006. Self-
referential processing in our brain-A meta-analysis of imaging studies on the self. 
NeuroImage 31, 440-457. 
O'Doherty, J.P., 2004. Reward representations and reward-related learning in the human 
brain: insights from neuroimaging. Curr.Opin.Neurobiol. 14, 769-776. 
Okuda, J., Fujii, T., Ohtake, H., Tsukiura, T., Tanji, K., Suzuki, K., Kawashima, R., Fukuda, 
H., Itoh, M., Yamadori, A., 2003. Thinking of the future and past: the roles of the 
frontal pole and the medial temporal lobes. NeuroImage. 19, 1369-1380. 
Phan, K. L., Wager, T. D., Taylor, S. F., Liberzon, I., 2004. Functional neuroimaging studies 
of human emotions. CNS Spectr. 9, 258-266. 
Poldrack, R.A., Wagner, A.D., Prull, M.W., Desmond, J.E., Glover, G.H., Gabrieli, J.D., 
1999. Functional specialization for semantic and phonological processing in the left 
inferior prefrontal cortex. NeuroImage. 10, 15-35. 
Schacter, D.L., Addis, D.R., 2007. The cognitive neuroscience of constructive memory: 
remembering the past and imagining the future. Philos.Trans.R.Soc.Lond B Biol.Sci. 
362, 773-786. 
Schultz, W., 2000. Multiple reward signals in the brain. Nat.Rev.Neurosci. 1, 199-207. 
Sharot, T., Riccardi, A. M., Raio, C. M., Phelps, E. A., in press. Neural mechanisms 
mediating optimism bias. Nature. 
Spreng, R.N., Levine, B., 2006. The temporal distribution of past and future autobiographical 
events across the lifespan. Mem. Cognit. 34, 1644-1651. 
Suddendorf, T., Busby, J., 2005. Making decisions with the future in mind: Developmental 
and comparative identification of mental time travel. Learning and Motivation 36, 
110-125. 
Suddendorf, T., Corballis, M.C., 2007. The evolution of foresight: What is mental time travel 
and is it unique to humans? Behav. Brain Sci. 30, 299-313. 
Svoboda, E., McKinnon, M.C., Levine, B., 2006. The functional neuroanatomy of 
autobiographical memory: a meta-analysis. Neuropsychologia 44, 2189-2208. 
 25
Szpunar, K.K., McDermott, K.B., in press. Episodic future thought and its relationship with 
remembering: Evidence from ratings of subjective experience. Conscious. Cogn. 
Szpunar, K.K., Watson, J.M., McDermott, K.B., 2007. Neural substrates of envisioning the 
future. Proc.Natl.Acad.Sci.U.S.A 104, 642-647. 
Taylor, S.E., Brown, J.D., 1988. Illusion and well-being: A social psychological perspective 
on mental health. Psychological Bulletin 103, 193-210. 
Trope, Y., Liberman, N., 2003. Temporal construal. Psychol.Rev. 110, 403-421. 
Tulving, E., 2005. Episodic memory and autonoesis: Uniquely human? In: Terrace, H.S., 
Metcalfe, J. (Eds.), The missing link in cognition: Origins of self-reflective 
consciousness. Oxford University Press, pp. 3-56. 
Tzourio-Mazoyer, N., Landeau, B., Papathanassiou, D., Crivello, F., Etard, O., Delcroix, N., 
Mazoyer, B., Joliot, M., 2002. Automated anatomical labeling of activations in SPM 
using a macroscopic anatomical parcellation of the MNI MRI single-subject brain. 
NeuroImage. 15, 273-289. 
Vandenberghe, R., Price, C., Wise, R., Josephs, O., Frackowiak, R.S., 1996. Functional 
anatomy of a common semantic system for words and pictures. Nature 383, 254-256. 
Williams, J.M.G., Ellis, N.C., Tyers, C., Healy, H., Rose, G., MacLeod, A.K., 1996. The 




Table 1. Ratings obtained during the pre-scan interview and fMRI session 
 Near future Far future  
 Positive Negative Positive Negative Routine 
Pre-scan interview      





























      
fMRI session      






















Standard deviations are shown in parentheses. Superscript letters indicate significant 
differences between conditions: means within a row that do not share a superscript were 
significantly different from each others (p < .05). 
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Table 2. MNI coordinates and Z values for brain regions with increased activity for near 
future events and far future events relative to routine activities 
 MNI coordinates   
 x y z Z Voxels 
Near future > Routine      
    Ventromedial PFC (BA 11) -3 42 -21 4.43a 138 
    Ventromedial PFC (BA 10) -3 57 -3 3.93a  
    Dorsomedial PFC (BA 9/10) 0 51 24 3.94b 48 
    L Posterior 
cingulate/retrosplenial cortex (BA 
30/31) 
-9 -57 27 5.25b 166 
    R inferior temporal gyrus (BA 
20) 
51 12 -39 4.23b 26 
    L temporoparietal junction (BA 
39) 
-48 -60 27 3.21b 22 
      
Far future > Routine      
    Ventromedial PFC (BA 11) -3 42 -21 4.69a 325 
    Ventromedial PFC (BA 10) 0 57 -3 3.98a  
    Dorsomedial PFC (BA 9/10) -3 51 21 3.88b  
    Posterior cingulate/retrosplenial 
cortex (BA 30/31) 
-6 -57 27 4.88b 118 
    L inferior temporal gyrus (BA 
20) 
-60 -9 -24 4.53b 45 
    R inferior temporal gyrus (BA 
20) 
48 -3 -39 4.39b 65 
    L temporoparietal junction (BA 
39) 
-48 -63 24 4.44b 88 
    R temporoparietal junction (BA 
39) 
48 -60 24 3.61b 30 
      
Conjunction analysis      
    Ventromedial PFC (BA 11) 0 45 -21 4.54a 287 
    Ventromedial PFC (BA 10) 0 57 -6 4.77a  
    Dorsomedial PFC (BA 9/10) -3 51 21 4.69b  
    Posterior cingulate/retrosplenial 
cortex (BA 30/31) 
-6 -57 27 6.00b 216 
    R inferior temporal gyrus (BA 
20) 
48 -3 -39 4.19b 17 
    L temporoparietal junction (BA 
39) 
-48 -63 27 3.66b 61 
L = left hemisphere; R = right hemisphere; L and R are not designated for maxima within 6 
mm of midline. BA = Brodmann’s area. PFC = prefrontal cortex. Ventromedial PFC refers to 
z coordinate ≤ 0 mm. 
a significant at p < .05 corrected for multiple comparisons at the voxel level over small 
volumes of interest (see Methods section for details) 
b significant at p < .001 (uncorrected) with an extent threshold of 10 voxels 
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Table 3. MNI coordinates and Z values for brain regions associated with the effect of 
temporal distance 
 MNI coordinates   
Brain region x y z Z Voxels 
Far future > Near future      
    Ventromedial PFC (BA 11) -3 51 -18 4.15a 31 
    L middle temporal gyrus (BA 
21) 
-51 -9 -15 4.24b 13 
    R inferior temporal gyrus (BA 
20) 
54 -12 -33 3.90b 29 
    L inferior temporal gyrus (BA 
20) 
-60 -15 -30 3.54b 20 
    L inferior frontal gyrus (BA 
47) 
-42 36 -18 3.75b 16 
      
Near future > Far future      
    L caudate nucleus -12 21 -3 4.20a 20 
L = left hemisphere; R = right hemisphere; L and R are not designated for maxima within 6 
mm of midline. BA = Brodmann’s area. PFC = prefrontal cortex. Ventromedial PFC refers to 
z coordinate ≤ 0 mm. 
a significant at p < .05 corrected for multiple comparisons at the voxel level over small 
volumes of interest (see Methods section for details) 
b significant at p < .001 (uncorrected) with an extent threshold of 10 voxels 
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Table 4. MNI coordinates and Z values for brain regions associated with the effect of valence 
 MNI coordinates   
Brain region x y z Z Voxels 
Positive > Negative      
    Ventromedial PFC (BA 10) 0 57 -3 4.03a 109 
    L caudate nucleus -12 15 3 3.98a 4 
    L middle/superior frontal gyrus 
(BA 8/9) 
-24 30 54 5.11b 142 
    Posterior cingulate/retrosplenial 
cortex (BA 30/31) 
-6 -63 18 4.77b 339 
    R inferior temporal gyrus (BA 20) 51 -18 -24 3.97b 41 
    L middle temporal gyrus (BA 21) -57 -33 3 3.65b 14 
    R inferior temporal gyrus (BA 
20/37) 
66 -48 -12 3.63b 12 
    L inferior temporal gyrus (BA 37) -57 -54 -18 3.49b 14 
    R temporoparietal junction (BA 
39) 
51 -72 21 4.19b 27 
    L temporoparietal junction (BA 39) -42 -75 24 3.92b 34 
    L hippocampus -18 -15 -15 3.67b 23 
    R parahippocampal gyrus (BA 35) 24 -27 -15 3.35b 17 
    Anterior cingulate (BA 24) -5 30 18 3.43b 31 
    Lingual gyrus (BA 18) -3 -78 -3 3.51b 15 
L = left hemisphere; R = right hemisphere; L and R are not designated for maxima within 6 
mm of midline. BA = Brodmann’s area. PFC = prefrontal cortex. Ventromedial PFC refers to 
z coordinate ≤ 0 mm. 
a significant at p < .05 corrected for multiple comparisons at the voxel level over small 
volumes of interest (see Methods section for details) 




Figure 1. Activations in medial prefrontal and medial posterior regions associated with (a) 
imagining near future events relative to routine activities, (b) imagining far future events 
relative to routine activities, and (c) the conjunction of near and far future events. Displayed at 
p < .001 (uncorrected) with an extent threshold of 10 voxels. 
 
Figure 2. Brain regions associated with the main effect of temporal distance: (a) activation in 
the ventromedial PFC (BA 11; peak activation at x = -3, y = 51, z = -18) when imagining the 
far future relative to the near future; (b) activation in the left caudate nucleus (peak activation 
at x = -12, y = 21, z = -3) when imagining the near future relative to the far future. Displayed 
at p < .001 (uncorrected) with an extent threshold of 10 voxels. Effect sizes correspond to 
average beta weight values from a 6mm sphere constructed around the local maximum for the 
group effect. Error bars represent the standard error of the mean. 
 
Figure 3. Activation in the ventromedial PFC (BA 10; peak activation at x = 0, y = 57, z = -3) 
when imagining positive relative to negative future events. Displayed at p < .001 
(uncorrected) with an extent threshold of 10 voxels. Effect sizes correspond to average beta 
weight values from a 6mm sphere constructed around the local maximum for the group effect. 
Error bars represent the standard error of the mean. 
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